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LAWS LIMITED DOMAIN CONFRONTS MORALITY'S
UNIVERSAL EMPIREt
LARRY ALEXANDER* & FREDERICK SCHAUER**
There is an ongoing debate in contemporary jurisprudence over
whether law, properly conceived, is capable of incorporating
morality. And this debate has its important practical analogues,
especially in American constitutional law. For this is where lawyers
and scholars argue about whether, for example, the guarantees of
equal protection, freedom of speech, and the free exercise of
religion, as well as the prohibitions on cruel and unusual punishments and unreasonable searches and seizures, require courts
and other governmental decision makers to adhere to the correct
moral principles regarding equality, freedom of speech, freedom of
religion, punishment, and (locational) privacy. That these and other
constitutional clauses appear to speak in moral language is
relatively uncontroversial, but far more controversial is what it
means for authoritative law to speak in moral language, and how,
if at all, such language connects law with what is simply and prelegally morally right (and wrong) to do.
These debates about the status of morality in legal argument are
important, but our goal here is not to engage them frontally.
Rather, we wish to illuminate a particular aspect of these debates.
And that aspect is the logic of the incorporation by law of morality,
t This paper was prepared for the Conference on Law and Morality, Institute of Bill of
Rights Law, William & Mary School of Law, March 16-18, 2006. We thank the other
participants and members of the audience for their helpful comments and criticisms. It was
later presented to the Legal Theory Colloquium at U.C.L.A_ School of Law, and again, we
thank the participants for their comments, particularly David Dolinko, Steve Gardbaum,
Mark Greenberg, Jerry Lopez, and Seana Shiffrin. We also thank Ken Himma, Steve Smith,
and Ken Winston for their comments, Peter Alces for organizing the conference, Seana
Shiffrin for organizing the colloquium, and the Joan Shorenstein Center on the Press,
Politics and Public Policy, Harvard University, for research support.
* Warren Distinguished Professor of Law, University of San Diego.
** Frank Stanton Professor of the First Amendment, John F. Kennedy School of
Government, Harvard University.
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and the way in which, if at all, law can retain its law-ness and its
ability to perform law's essential functions while still being open to
the full universe of moral considerations. In a word, we do not
believe that this is possible, and thus we believe, and shall argue
here, that even when law incorporates morality, law can only serve
its primary and essential functions if it has a considerable degree
of resistance to the pressure of at least some morally correct moral
claims. In other words, we strive here to make the moral argument
for law's ignoring of at least some moral arguments in legal decision
making.
I. REASONS, MORAL AND OTHERWISE
We start with the premise that morality, at least morality as we
conceive of it, is the domain of practical reason that asks what one
ought to do, all reasons considered. Under this view, all reasons are
subordinate to the moral "ought" because the moral "ought"--or at
least the strong moral ought that expresses an obligation-takesall
reasons into account.' But even though we believe that this premise
is correct, and although it makes our conclusion here starker, in
fact, this premise is not strictly necessary to our argument.2 For
even if moral reasons constitute but a subset of the universe of all
reasons, they still, tautologically, occupy the full universe of moral
space. And thus from either the broad premise that morality
pervades all of practical reason, or from the narrower and tautological premise that morality pervades only the entire universe of moral
reasons, we can still ask what it would mean for law to incorporate
1. We recognize that there are some who reject this view of morality, instead viewing
morality as a domain of reasons that do not necessarily subsume or override (and the two are
not the same) all the reasons there are. The issue is usefully discussed in ROBERT AUDI, THE
ARCHITECTURE OF REASON: THE STRUCTURE AND SUBSTANCE OF RATIONALITY 162-64 (2001).

To put the point differently, some take the set of moral reasons to be merely a subset of the
set of reasons for action, in contrast to others, who take morality as a necessary component
of any (good) reason. See, e.g., Douglas W. Portmore, Position-RelativeConsequentialism,
Agent-Centered Options, and Supererogation,113 ETHICS 303 (2003). In the context of this
Essay, we do not need definitely to resolve the question. For our purposes here, all that must
be true is that reasons that bear on what one is legally obligated or permitted to do operate
within the same domain as the reasons that bear on what one is morally obligated or
permitted to do.
2. We are grateful to Arthur Ripstein for helping us to see this point.
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morality, either as part of the rule of recognition as a necessary or
sufficient condition of legal validity in a given legal system, 3 or as
the referent of some more quotidian legal directive such as a
constitutional or statutory provision. In our view of law, which
posits that legal reasons are a "limited domain" of all the reasons
there are, and also, and importantly, that moral legal reasons are
a limited domain of all the moral reasons there are, legal incorporation of morality presents the odd case of the subset incorporating
the larger set, and thus suggests the peculiar image of a mouse
attempting to swallow a python.
II. LAW'S LIMITED DOMAIN

We believe it to be a relatively uncontroversial aspect of our
experiences as lawyers and, more generally, of our experiences with
the law as citizens, that law has a "limited domain."4 By that we
mean that legal reasons for decisions make up only a subset of
all the practical reasons that bear on them.5 Typically, to find the
3. See, e.g., H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 97-107 (1961) (explaining the "rule of

recognition").
4. See Frederick Schauer, The Limited Domain of the Law, 90 VA. L.REV. 1909, 1914-18
(2004). For an interesting discussion of the idea, see Gerald J.Postema, Law's Autonomy and
PublicPracticalReason, in THE AUTONOMY OF LAW: ESSAYS ON LEGAL POSITIVISM 79, 82-88
(Robert P. George ed., 1996). We say "relatively uncontroversial" because the more extreme
versions of Legal Realism would deny the existence of any space between what legal decision
makers can and do take into account and what any other decision makers, in or out of a legal
environment, would take into account. See generally AMERICAN LEGAL REASONING 170-71
(William W. Fisher III et al. eds., 1993). For present purposes, we simply assert our disbelief
in such claims, and thus rely on the view that law as we experience it is a domain in which
at least some reasons, arguments, and facts available in other decisional domains are not
available in the domain of the law.
5. We emphatically bracket the incorporationist or inclusivist position that a society
could treat all (and only) moral reasons as legal reasons and still count as a legal system, at
least as long as the decision to understand a particular legal system in this way was a social
decision and a social fact, and not a necessary feature of all possible legal systems in all
possible worlds. See JULES L. COLEMAN, THE PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE: IN DEFENCE OF A
PRAGMATISTAPPROACHTOLEGALTHEORY 107-18 (2001); W.J. WALUCHOW, INCLUSIVE LEGAL
POSITIVISM 1-8 (1994); Jules L. Coleman, Negativeand PositivePositivism, 11 J. LEGAL STUD.
139,141-44 (1982); Eleni Mitrophanous, Soft Positivism, 17 OXFORDJ. LEGALSTUD. 621,62327 (1997). For even if we accept for the sake of argument that such a system could exist and
still count as a legal system, it is not the system that exists in the United States and other
advanced democracies, and it is not the system that lawyers perceive and experience in their
professional lives.
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law we look in the CaliforniaReporters, in the West Publishing
Company's Digests, in the United States Code Annotated, in the
Code of FederalRegulations, and in the American Law Institute's
Restatements.' We do not look for it-at least as an initial matterin Plato's Republic, in John Stuart Mill's On Liberty, in papal
encyclicals, in New York Times editorials, in law review articles, or
even in the laws of foreign jurisdictions.' And when we occasionally
do consult these latter sources of practical reasons to ascertain the
law, we typically do so only because judicial decisions, constitutional provisions, statutes, and other similar primary legal items
purport to authorize us to do so.
Indeed, just as law's limited domain of reasons and their sources
can be expanded by authorization from within that limited domain,
so too is that limited domain kept limited by explicitly making some
sources of practical reasons legally out of bounds. In the United
States, religious sources may not be used as legal sources, though
the issue is of course a good deal more complex than that flat

6. Ruth Gavison's nice phrase-first-stage law-captures well this pre-theoretical, but
largely accurate, way in which the initial and primary encounter with law by lawyers and
citizens and officials occurs through the limited domain of largely positivistically conceived
legal materials. Ruth Gavison, Comment: Legal Theory and the Role of Rules, 14 HARV. J.L.
& PUB. POLY 727, 740-41 (1991); see also Ruth Gavison, Comment, in ISSUES IN
CONTEMPORARY LEGAL PHILOSOPHY: THE INFLUENCE OF H.L.A. HART21, 29-32 (Ruth Gavison
ed., 1987); Frederick Schauer & Virginia J. Wise, Legal Positivism as Legal Information,82
CORNELL L. REv. 1080, 1081-83, 1093-96 (1997).
7. The question of foreign law is obviously hotly contested these days. See Roper v.
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575-78 (2005); id. at 622-28 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Lawrence v.
Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 572-73 (2003); id. at 598 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Atkins v. Virginia, 536
U.S. 304, 316-17 n.20 (2002); id. at 324-25 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); Rex D. Glensy,
Which Countries Count?: Lawrence v. Texas and the Selection of Foreign Persuasive
Authority, 45 VA. J. INT'L L. 357, 358-59 (2005); Vicki C. Jackson, Constitutional
Comparisons:Convergence,Resistance, Engagement, 119 HARV. L. REv. 109, 116-28 (2005);
Laura E. Little, TransnationalGuidance in Terrorism Cases, 38 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV.
1, 1-4 (2006); John 0. McGinnis, Foreignto Our Constitution,100 Nw. U. L. REV. 303, 303-09
(2006); Jeremy Waldron, ForeignLaw and the Modern Ius Gentium, 119 HARV. L. REV. 129,
143-47 (2005); Ernest A. Young, ForeignLaw and the DenominatorProblem, 119 HARV. L.
REV. 148, 161-67 (2005). But even those who are most enthusiastic about the genuinely
authoritative reception of foreign law into the American legal canon would accept, for now,
its decidedly secondary status. Still, we acknowledge that what we say about the authority
of foreign law, and a host of other less central sources, is a contingent empirical claim
describing a non-static state of affairs. See Frederick Schauer & Virginia J. Wise, Nonlegal
Information and the Delegalizationof Law, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 495, 514-15 (2000).
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statement reveals.8 And there are other potential, and even
potentially reliable, sources of reasons for legal decisions that are
legally impermissible, such as what the judge's mother, or what a
major political figure, conceivably for very good moral reasons,
would like the judge to decide.
Moreover, we can understand why law has a limited domain. Law
exists against a background of moral disagreement and moral
uncertainty; for if people generally agreed about what morality
required, there would then not be much reason to substitute law for
the direct moral decision making of citizens and officials alike. But
because this is not a world we recognize, and because moral and
practical disagreement seems endemic to the human condition, law
must step in to settle practical controversies over what ought to be
done. But law can fulfill this role only if its domain-the reasons
law consults to determine what ought to be done-is less than that
of all practical reasons or even of all moral reasons. In any society
not made up of all-knowing gods-including societies made up of
totally altruistic but not all-knowing angels--deciding what ought
to be done only by recourse to the entire domain of practical reasons
or moral reasons would serve more to foment disagreement than to
ameliorate it. A legal system in which the law (embodying legal
norms as well as legal officials and legal procedures) were coextensive with the universe of moral norms would serve primarily to
embroil the citizens in never-ending and enormously morally costly
controversy over what "the law" required. There would also be
controversy over seemingly more procedural issues whose resolution had moral valence, such as the question even of who counted
as a legal official and whether a controversy did or did not belong
in the legal system. Settling such matters and avoiding the huge
moral costs of controversy requires recourse to a limited domain of
reasons about which there is little controversy, or, if controversial,
the content of which can be authoritatively settled by officials or by
procedures that can be noncontroversially identified. And that is
why we have both argued that one of law's principal functions8. See, e.g., Robert Audi, The Place of Religious Argument in a Free and Democratic
Society, in LAwAND RELIGION: A CRITICALANTHOLOGY 69-70 (Stephen M. Feldman ed., 2000)
(arguing that "religious arguments may be properly used in a free and democratic society in
a way that neither masks their religious character nor undermines a desirable separation").
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perhaps its single principal function-is its settlement function.9
And the settlement function necessitates, as a practical matter even
if not as a0 strictly logical one, that law consult a limited domain of
1
reasons.
Let us expand a bit on why law must have a limited domain in
order to fulfill its crucially important settlement function. If people
were gods-if they were all-knowing-then they could determine on
their own what the totality of practical reasons required of them for
each practical decision they faced. That knowledge would have to
include the knowledge of what everyone else was going to doassuming that doing the right thing always requires anticipating
the behavior of others-but we have stipulated that these people
are omniscient. And with the benefit of this omniscience, these
people would have no need of simplified guidance with respect to
the dictates of morality.
In such a world, law would therefore have no moral function.
Morality would be a sufficient guide, as everyone would know what
was morally required in each situation. And in such a world, law
would either replicate morality exactly, in which case it would be
otiose, or it would diverge at various points from morality, in which
case it would be immoral. Of course, the people we have imagined
are all-knowing gods, and not necessarily maximally moral angels,
so they might not be motivated to comply with what they know
morality demands. Nevertheless, if they did not comply, morality
itself would dictate how others should respond to them. After all,
there are moral theories of corrective and retributive justice that
have, as their subject matter, non-angelic behavior. 1
In the world we inhabit, however, people are neither angels nor,
more importantly, gods. And in this world law does have a function,
and that function is best understood as a moral one. This is because
the norms of morality are not themselves in our world a sufficient
9. See, e.g., LARRY ALEXANDER & EMILY SHERWIN, THE RULE OF RULES: MORALITY,
RULES, AND THE DILEMMAS OF LAW (2001); FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A

PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE 167-74
(1991).
10. See Joseph Raz, Incorporationby Law, 10 LEGAL THEORY 1, 8-10 (2004).
11. See, e.g., Michael S. Moore, The Moral Worth of Retribution, in RESPONSIBILITY,
CHARACTER, AND THE EMOTIONS: NEW ESSAYS IN MORAL PSYCHOLOGY 179 (Ferdinand
Schoeman ed., 1987) (describing and defending a retributive theory of punishment).
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guide to which course of action is morally necessary. Such failure of
morality to guide effectively is sometimes the consequence of the
shape of morality itself, for the often abstract content of morality
makes it likely to be debated and uncertain. And sometimes
morality's ineffectiveness as a practical guide stems from the way
in which the concrete demands of morality turn in a vast number
of instances on so many factual determinations that they are
beyond the ken of ordinary (or even extraordinary) people. The
domain of morality, even though it may not be co-terminus with the
domain of all practical reasons-moral reasons are, for example,
often thought to be different from reasons of prudence or etiquette-nonetheless takes all of these practical reasons into
account. So in a very real sense, morality comprehends and weighs
all practical
reasons, and in this sense can be thought of as
12
unlimited.
In the decidedly real world in which the commands of morality
are both uncertain and contested, law provides much-needed
practical guidance by greatly reducing the amount of knowledge
required to make practical decisions. In many instances, law
simplifies morality sufficiently for ordinary people to be guided
by it. In other instances, law simplifies morality sufficiently for
lawyers, though perhaps not ordinary citizens, to understand what
conclusions they should reach. 3 But in all instances, law simplifies
morality by giving clearer guidance than morality simpliciter, and
in doing so it makes a practical difference. 4

12. But see supra Part I (discussing the relation of moral reasons to other practical
reasons).
13. And that is why the role of the lawyer may itself have a moral dimension in real and
thus second-best societies.
14. See Scott J. Shapiro, The Difference That Rules Make, in ANALYZING LAW: NEW
ESSAYS IN LEGAL THEORY 33, 47-49, 54-56 (Brian Bix ed., 1998) [hereinafter Shapiro,
Difference]; Scott J. Shapiro, On Hart's Way Out, 4 LEGAL THEORY 469, 503-05 (1998). Our
argument here is partly a normative one-settlement is morally beneficial-and partly a
nonnormative one of spelling out the requirements of the settlement function. With respect
to the normative argument, we should not be taken to deny that specific laws or even entire
legal systems might turn out to be morally hideous. Rather, what we do deny is that in a
decent society not populated by gods, moral decision making unaided by processes for
authoritative settlement of moral controversy will be morally better than moral decision
making subject to processes for authoritative settlement. But see infra notes 19-20. (We
thank Ken Himma for prompting the content of this paragraph.)
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Law thus carries out its guidance function by limiting its domain
of reasons, and in doing so furthers morality by enabling huge
moral costs to be avoided. Among these costs are simply those of
making erroneous decisions, a consequence of failures of guidance
for real people making real decisions. In addition, morality unmediated by law is likely to produce an additional array of erroneous decisions that are the consequence of people failing to anticipate
the decisions of others.1" Still further, controversy itself entails a
variety of moral costs (such as by making morally desirable
collaboration and cooperation more difficult or more costly), and
decision making under conditions of moral unclarity and moral
uncertainty will itself bring high decision-making costs. All of these
costs are moral costs, because all of them take us farther away from
the morally best state of affairs.
Thus, what we have called law's settlement function is ultimately
a shorthand for law's role in providing practical guidance and thus
reducing the moral costs that would exist in its absence, even if
people were maximally beneficent angels, as long as they were not
maximally omniscient gods. The settlement function consequently
necessitates that law's domain be a (greatly) truncated domain of
all the practical reasons that bear on making morally correct
decisions. In other words, law's function-its moral function, if you
will-requires that its domain, unlike morality's domain, be a
limited one.
In our view, law's connection to morality is thus a complex
relationship whose complexity is directly a function of the role that
law serves in non-ideal societies in which uncertainty and disagreement are pervasive. Thus, law's determinacy is right at the core of
its moral function, and law serves its moral function of reducing
the moral costs of error, of conflict, of lack of coordination, and of
time and resource-consuming decision making by claiming practical
authority for its more determinate commands. And this view of law
applies whether those more determinate commands issue from
constitutions or instead from the institutions that constitutions
legitimate. When law's subjects follow the law because it is the
15. On law as serving an important moral coordination function, see Gerald J. Postema,
Coordinationand Convention at the Foundationsof Law, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 165, 182-97
(1982); Noel B. Reynolds, Law as Convention, 2 RATIO JURIS 105, 115-18 (1989).

2007]

LAW'S LIMITED DOMAIN

1587

law,'" they substitute law's commands for the less determinate and
more controversial all-things-considered oughts of morality. In the
Razian conception of practical authority, that is what law, to be law,
must claim, or so Raz argues; v and it is the conception of practical
authority that we, too, endorse. Unlike in law, however, in (pure
unmediated) morality there are no practical authorities-there are
no persons or institutions whose commands preempt subjects' 8own
determinations about what is morally required or permitted.'
Paradoxically perhaps, although not to us, law's moral function
thus always puts law into potential conflict with the morality it
serves. Law claims authority, and must do so in order to serve its
moral function.' 9 By contrast, morality denies this division of moral
labor2 ° and thus denies law's claim to practical authority. As a
result, it may well be the case that moral agents would have good
moral reasons for rejecting those claims of law that they believe to
be morally erroneous, just as the law has good moral reasons for
imposing its legal will on those same moral agents who, from the
law's perspective, mistakenly refuse to accept the law's wise
guidance. And this is the legal-moral relationship of dependence
and conflict that one of us has labeled "the asymmetry of
16. On whether our understanding of law's functions thus necessitates the existence of
a moral obligation to obey the law qua law, see infra note 17. See also JOSEPH RAz, THE
AUTHORITY OF LAW: ESSAYS ON LAW AND MORALITY 233-49 (1979) (arguing there is no
obligation to obey the law).
17. See RAZ, supra note 16, at 30-33, 44-45; see also Joseph Raz,Facing Up: A Reply, 62
S. CAL. L. REv. 1153, 1183-87 (1989); Raz, supra note 10, at 6-10; Joseph Raz, The Obligation
To Obey: Revision and Tradition, 1 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POLY 139, 140-49
(1984).
18. Or at least in the secular moral traditions we assume here. There are, of course, some
religious traditions in which moral authority plays a central role, and in these traditions it
might make sense to say that there are authoritative determinations of just what morality
is, and just what legally unmediated morality requires. But the status of authority within
various religious traditions (including the question whether such authority counts as law)
is beyond both our expertise and our project here.
19. Some theorists deny this. See, e.g., Kenneth Einar Himma, Law's Claim of Legitimate
Authority, in HART'S POSTSCRIPT: ESSAYS ON THE POSTSCRIPT TO THE CONCEPTOF LAW 271
(Jules Coleman ed., 2001). We are not so sure that what law claims-asopposed to what law
is-is important, but we let this complication pass. See Frederick Schauer, Positivism
Through Thick and Thin, in ANALYZING LAW: NEW ESSAYS IN LEGAL THEORY, supra note 14,
at 65, 73-77.
20. On the various complications ofthe very idea ofa division of moral labor, see ARTHUR
ISAK APPLBAUM, ETHICS FOR ADVERSARIES: THE MORALITY OF ROLES IN PUBLIC AND
PROFESSIONAL LIFE 197-202 (1999).
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authority,"2 1 and the other of us has labeled, more simply, as "the
gap.
III. ON THE RULE-LIKE NATURE OF A LEGAL SYSTEM
Under the view just presented, the limited domain feature of a
legal system enables law, in the large, to function in much the same
way as do individual rules, in the small. An individual rule, as is
well-known, achieves its rule-ness by cutting off access, either
absolutely or presumptively, to the full range of considerations
bearing on some decision, and even to the background justifications
whose purposes the rule was designed to serve. 23 Although it may
24
well be the case that a hypothetical "No Vehicles in the Park Rule
would have been designed to promote safety and reduce noise, the
embodiment of those purposes in a concrete rule channels decision
making into the question whether something is a vehicle and away
from whether that something is dangerous or noisy. And, even more
obviously, a "Speed Limit 65" rule limits decision making under it,
again either absolutely or presumptively, to the consideration of
whether a vehicle was or was not exceeding the speed of sixty-five
miles per hour, thus cutting off consideration of whether this
vehicle was being operated safely, properly, prudently, reasonably,
or whatever.2 5
Once we understand that rules operate by eliminating consideration of what may well be in some particular instance actually
relevant considerations, and that they do so in order to simplify and
regularize decision making, we can see that the system of law as a
whole, understood (in part) as a collection of rules, does exactly the
same thing in a larger scale. Just as an individual rule achieves
21. SCHAUER, supra note 9, at 128-34; see also Frederick Schauer, Imposing Rules, 42
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 85, 87-90 (2005); Frederick Schauer, The Questions of Authority, 81 GEO.
L.J. 95, 110-15 (1992).
22. ALEXANDER & SHERWIN, supra note 9, at 53-61; see also Larry Alexander & Emily
Sherwin, The Deceptive Nature of Rules, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1191, 1191-93 (1994); Larry
Alexander, The Gap, 14 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLY 695, 695-97 (1991).
23. See Frederick Schauer, The Convergence of Rules and Standards,2003 N.Z. L. REV.
303, 305-11.
24. H.L.A. Hart, Positivismand the Separationof Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593,
607-08 (1958).
25. See generally Schauer, supra note 23, at 309-11.
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predictability, stability, and constraint on decision-maker discretion
by cutting off access to even some relevant reasons and considerations, so does a legal system achieve the same goals, and achieve
the virtues of moral settlement in the face of moral disagreement,
by similarly cutting off access to some relevant reasons and
considerations. But whereas an individual rule cuts off access by
relying on the linguistically (comparatively) clear indications of an
individual rule-formulation, the legal system cuts off access by
relying on a conception of a limited domain of legal rules in order to
block consideration of the less determinate and more variable full
universe of reasons (and non-legal rules), moral or otherwise. So
just as an individual rule uses its formulation to narrow the range
of usable considerations, so does a legal system use its limited
domain to narrow the range of usable considerations, and for the
same reasons and to the same effect.
IV. "MODEST" INCORPORATION OF MORALITY: OF LEGISLATION AND
STANDARDS

We should make it clear that there is no practical or conceptual
difficulty with having legal officials consult morality's universal
domain of reasons on those occasions when the officials are
compelled to fill legal lacunae. If legal reasons do not decide a
particular case, then there is nothing amiss in-indeed, there is
everything right about-the judge's asking what would be the
morally best decision given the constraintsof the settled law that the
judge is not legally authorized to change.26 Plainly many would
disagree with our qualification that the judge has no authorization
to change the settled law, and would say that whether a judge has
26. This practice is what H.L.A. Hart described as "discretion" in HART, supra note 3, at
252. And this is the characterization that Ronald Dworkin set out to challenge in RONALD
DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIoUSLY 22,33-39,68-71 (1977) [hereinafter DWORKIN, RIGHTS].
In LAW'S EMPIRE and other more recent work, Dworkin made clear that his interpretive
account of legal decision making was not limited to instances in which settled law left gaps
to be filled. See generallyRONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 1-15, 43-44 (1986). But the earlier
work, and especially Dworkin's account of what the referee should do in the legallyunprovided-for staring dispute in the Fischer-Tal chess match, is much more compatible with
seeing morality as coming into the picture only when there are gaps in the law. See
DWORKIN, RIGHTS, supra, at 101-05.
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such authority is exactly the question at issue. But lest we be
accused of begging the central question, we note here that allowing
such authority to judges would entail allowing judges to change
the settled law whenever the judge's all-things-considered moral
judgment produced a superior outcome, and it is just that
conception of the judicial role (or a citizen's power) that we take to
be inconsistent with law's settlement function. And, of course,
legislators-who are legally authorized to change the legal constraints (except those that are constitutional and can only be
changed by another set of "legislators")-may and should ask what
is the morally preferred change or set of changes in the legal
landscape among those legal constraints they are authorized to
change. We shall label this modest role for morality's universal
domain's entrance into law's limited domain as "modest (or hard
case, or gap-filling, or legislative) incorporationism." This modest
role for morality is most apparent when the law is changed, for it is
always or almost always some non-legal factor that provides the
purchase for legal change.2 7 And this modest role for morality is
also apparent not only when law is changed in the strict sense of
"change," but also when there is a gap in the law that the circumstances of the world, or of some dispute, require be filled. Moreover,
it is also important to note that this modest role for morality
surfaces whenever a legal norm is interpreted or understood to be
a "standard" rather than a "rule."2 8 When that is the case, the very
indeterminacy (or vagueness, if you will) of the standard obligates
the decision maker to make the morally best decision within the
largely determinate boundaries of rules that are significantly
indeterminate within those boundaries.2 9
27. We acknowledge that legal change is occasionally the consequence of simple
inconsistency between a superior and an inferior legal norm, or the consequence of some
other condition whose remedy can be understood as largely technical or internal. But we do
not believe we are being especially controversial in describing such circumstances as rare,
at least when compared to the occasions when legal change is the consequence of some
inconsistency between existing legal norms and some other existing or desired norms of
policy or principle. See MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, THE NATURE OF THE COMMON LAW 80-83
(1988).
28. See generally Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42
DUKE L.J. 557 (1992); Russell B. Korobkin, Behavioral Analysis and Legal Form:Rules vs.
StandardsRevisited, 79 OR. L. REV. 23 (2000); Schauer, supra note 23.
29. Some theorists, including most exclusive positivists, deny not only that morality is
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In the most highly determinate versions of civil law, versions
ironically better associated with the writings of Jeremy Bentham
than with the actual legal systems that exist in actual civil law
countries, such an interstitial role for morality would be relatively
inconsequential, although even for Bentham it would not be totally
absent in practice or in theory.30 But in all common law systems,
and in all systems that employ highly indeterminate constitutional
or, less often, statutory language, 3 law leaves many questions
legally unanswered and many decisions legally undecided; and
when that is the case, this incorporative role for morality, although
modest in terms of its theoretical status, nonetheless plays a
significant role in actual legal practice. And this role we cheerfully

part of the concept of law, but also that morality is part of the law even when legal officials
consult it in this modest, retail way. For them, only the decisions the officials reach, or the
laws the officials craft as a result of consulting morality, are part of the law because only
they can serve law's settlement function, and because any mistake the officials make
regarding morality is usually taken to be a moral but not a legal mistake. See, e.g., RAZ,
supra note 16, at 47-52; Joseph Raz, Authority, Law and Morality, 68 MONIST 295, 315-20
(1985); Raz, supra note 10, at 10-14; Joseph Raz, Legal Principlesand the Limits of Law, in
RONALDDWORKINAND CONTEMPORARYJURISPRUDENCE 73, 77-79 (Marshall Cohen ed., 1984);
Shapiro, On Hart's Way Out, supranote 14, at 497-99,506-07; Shapiro, Difference, supranote
14, at 56-59; see also Brian Bix, Patrollingthe Boundaries: Inclusive Legal Positivism and
the Nature of JurisprudentialDebate, 12 CAN. J.L. & JURIS. 17, 27-28 (1999). Others,
primarily inclusive legal positivists, argue that when officials are (legally) authorized to
consult morality, the morality they consult can be part of "the law" in the legal system that
permits such consultation. See WALUCHOW, supra note 5, at 114-17; Jules L. Coleman,
Incorporationism,Conventionality,and the PracticalDifference Thesis, 4 LEGAL THEORY 381,
408, 423-24 (1998); Kenneth Einar Himma, Incorporationismand the Objectivity of Moral
Norms, 5 LEGAL THEORY 415, 415-17, 430-34 (1999). And although the debate between

inclusivists and exclusivists is about the concept of law and not about particular legal
systems, neither camp denies that morality can (and, to some, should) be consulted in this
modest way, although some normative exclusivists regret the circumstances that require this
modest moral consultation because they view a substantial lack of legal settlement as a
serious moral, as well as pragmatic, defect in any legal system. See, e.g., TOM D. CAMPBELL,
THE LEGAL THEORY OF ETHICAL POsITIvISM 125-29 (1996); see also Larry Alexander, 'With
Me, It's All er Nuthin": Formalism in Law and Morality, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 530, 531-36
(1999); Frederick Schauer, ConstitutionalPositivism, 25 CONN. L. REV. 797, 810-19 (1993);
Jeremy Waldron, Normative (or Ethical)Positivism, in HART'S POSTSCRIPT, supra note 19,
at 410, 419-28.
30. See JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND

LEGISLATION 281-93 (J.H. Burns & H.L.A. Hart eds., 1996) (presenting an argument for the
interplay and separation of morality and legislation in punishment).
31. For example, the prohibition in the Sherman Antitrust Act of "[e]very contract,
combination ... or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce." 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000).
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acknowledge, although we acknowledge as well that the size of this
role is itself a moral decision. 2
V. STRONG INCORPORATIONISM I: MORALITY AS SUFFICIENT FOR

LEGALITY
If modest incorporation of (or reference to) morality by law is not
a problem for legal theory, because morality's universal domain
appears only interstitially and accordingly cannot undermine the
limited domain-ness of law, then what of thoroughgoing incorporation of morality by law? Consider a rule of recognition in some legal
system that makes a norm's status as a moral norm sufficient for its
being a legal norm. In such a case, given morality's universal
domain, morality would swamp and obliterate any attempt at
having a limited domain for law. Now there are two ways to view
this situation. On the one hand, we might say that because morality's domain is universal and thus comprehends all practical
reasons, strong incorporation of morality by law of this type results
in the necessity of consulting all practical reasons to determine
legal norms. But it is not clear how ordinary posited legal
norms-the norms of law's limited domain-would figure in this
account if those norms could not affect morality; and thus, from this
perspective, it remains difficult to perceive how there could be any
role at all for law in the limited domain sense.3 4
There is yet another way to understand the situation. We might
view strong incorporation of morality by law as producing two sets
of legal norms: those determined by consulting a limited domain of
materials and sources identified by the nonmoral components of
the rule of recognition-that is, constitutional texts, statutes,
government regulations, reported court decisions, and even some
number of previously pedigreed "considerations" (principles, canons,
maxims, and the like)-and those determined by morality itself.
But in this case, either the morality-generated norms will conflict
32. See supra note 29.
33. As it might be under some, but certainly not all, natural law theories. See Schauer,
supra note 29, at 798 & n.1.
34. But see the discussion of Michael Moore's position, infra notes 35-42 and
accompanying text.
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with the norms of the limited domain so that "the law" will be
internally contradictory, or the former norms will be consistent with
the latter but outstrip them and render them superfluous. If the
limited domain conflicts with the unlimited domain-and both are
"the law"-then there are legal as well as moral reasons to resolve
the conflict in favor of morality. And if the limited domain does not
conflict with the unlimited domain, then the limited domain is not
doing any independent legal or moral work. So no matter how we
look at it, there will be no role for a limited domain of reasons under
what we label here "strong incorporationism."
Perhaps, however, there is another possibility. Consider the
position of Michael Moore, for example, who might be understood
as claiming that a norm's status as a moral norm is sufficient for its
status as a legal one.35 He claims, after all, not only that consistency
with morality is necessary for legality-law, to be law, must morally
obligate-but in a variety of instances he also appears to go further
and to see posited law as merely a prism through which to discover
"true" law, that is, morality.3" For Moore, posited law stands in
relation to true law as the shadows in Plato's cave stand in relation
to the Forms.37 Nonetheless, the posited law is important to Moore
because it can effect a change in morality. Before a law is enacted,
morality may permit (or forbid) X; after the law is enacted, morality
may forbid (or permit) X. Posited law-the law of the limited
domain-may do so because it affects the facts to which moral
norms apply, such as by inducing reliance. In such cases, however,
the moral norms themselves, as opposed to what applications they
entail, remain unaffected.3 8 But posited law may also effect a
change in morality because procedural values, such as the value of
35. See Michael S. Moore, Authority, Law, and Razian Reasons, 62 S. CAL. L. REv. 827,
859,872-73 (1989); Michael S. Moore, Legal PrinciplesRevisited, 82 IOWAL. REV. 867, 875-79
(1997); Michael S. Moore, A Natural Law Theory of Interpretation,58 S. CAL. L. REV. 277,
286, 376-77 (1985) [hereinafter Moore, A Natural Law Theory]; Michael S. Moore, The
Semantics of Judging, 54 S. CAL. L. REV. 151, 292-94 (1981).
36. See, e.g., Moore, A Natural Law Theory, supra note 35, at 388-94. For a similar
perspective, and with a similar semantic as well as moral grounding, see David 0. Brink,
Legal Theory, Legal Interpretation,and JudicialReview, 17 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 105, 119, 12433 (1988); David 0. Brink, Semantics and Legal Interpretation(FurtherThoughts), 2 CAN.
J.L. & JuRis. 181, 190-91 (1989).
37. PLATo, THE REPUBLIC 220-23 (G.R.F. Ferrari ed., Tom Griffith trans., 2000).
38. Moore, A NaturalLaw Theory, supra note 35, at 383-86.
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democratic rule, may count in favor of the morally obligatory force
of a posited law that is otherwise at odds with morality. This limits
Moore's interest in posited law to those legal norms that have been
enacted democratically. And of course, many would dispute the
claim that a democratic pedigree carries any moral weight beyond
whatever epistemic value it might serve in determining one's moral
obligations. But on the view that we are attributing to Moore, it is
democratic enactment that has the power to make what is morally
wrong morally right, and vice versa-a conclusion that strikes us
and others as highly implausible.39
The most charitable reading of Moore's sufficiency thesis is that
he sees posited law as serving the moral function of settlement and
thus having a place in a pervasively moralized account of law and
legal decision. Yet where he and we differ is that he sees this value
as a value to be weighed against other moral values,4 ° whereas we
regard settlement as the alternative to moral weighing and not
39. See generally Larry Alexander & Ken Kress, Against Legal Principles,82 IOWA L.
REV. 739 (1997).
We should also point out that just as direct incorporation of morality by law undermines
law's settlement function, so too does the indirect incorporation that Dworkin's view of
adjudication requires. Dworkin argues that judges should resolve legal disputes by recourse
to legal principles. Because he argues that the moral value of integrity demands this, the
demand should logically extend to legislators and their legislation as well. See id. at 774-75.
Legal principles are themselves the product of "fit" with past legal decisions--judicial and
legislative-and moral acceptability. Put succinctly, legal principles are the morally best
principles that can justify past legal decisions.
One way to put Dworkin's conception of a legal principle is as a counterfactual: legal
principles are those principles that would be morally correct in a world in which some
morally mistaken decisions were morally correct. We doubt that this counterfactual question
is coherent-unless, that is, its answer is "the same as those principles that are morally
correct, but with exceptions carved out to cover past mistakes and only past mistakes." See
id. at 764-66. So legal principles will either turn out for all practical purposes to be identical
to correct moral principles, or else their elaboration will require answering an incoherent
counterfactual.
Moreover, if the counterfactual can be answered in such a way as to avoid making
Dworkinian legal principles identical to correct moral ones, those legal principles become
doubly unattractive: Unlike determinate legal rules, they cannot serve the settlement
function, for determining what the legal principles are requires recourse to the very moral
principles whose controversiality gives rise to the need for settlement. But unlike moral
principles, legal principles, not being identical thereto, do not, even correctly formulated,
produce the morally correct result. Recourse to Dworkinian legal principles, in other words,
possesses the worst attributes of both recourse to determinate legal rules-the possibility of
incorrect applications-and recourse to moral principles-controversiality.
40. See Moore, A Natural Law Theory, supra note 35, at 390-91.
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itself capable of being weighed. Law claims practical authority;4 '
and the authority of law, being logically antecedent to law, is not
something that can be weighed against the very reasons on which
the putatively authoritative claim is based.42
VI. STRONG INCORPORATIONISM II: MORALITY AS NECESSARY FOR

LEGALITY
But what about those various versions of rules of recognition that
would make consistency with morality a criterion of legal validity?
Such a role for morality-as a necessary rather than as a sufficient
condition for legality-might appear to be consistent with law's
limited domain and settlement function, because morality would
operate as a side constraint, or check, and not have as central a
role. Yet closer inspection reveals that even this seemingly less
ambitious role for morality is inconsistent with law's limited
domain and settlement function. For if consistency with morality is
a necessary condition for legality, then no official's pronouncements
could ever legally settle a moral controversy. If A believes that the
judge's determination of his dispute with B is not in accord with
morality's universal domain, he will not view the judge's judgment
as legally binding, much less morally so. A's interpretation of the
rule of recognition tells him that the judge's determination is not
legally valid. Someone with this view of morality's role in grounding
legal validity will thus not obtain from law the particular kind of
guidance that we take to be essential to law's principal function.
The reason that this problem with making morality a necessary
condition of legal validity usually goes unnoticed is that we quite
naturally assume that the highest official(s) in the legal hierarchy-the Supreme Court, for example-can settle what is legally
the case. The parties, the sheriff, the lower courts, and everyone
else must go along, so we think, even if these various agents believe
41. See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text.
42. This claim is closely related to one side of the debate about whether a serious form
of rule-based constraint can be compatible with the (rule) value of the rule being weighed in
every case. CompareSCHAUER, supra note 9, at 93-100, with Gerald J. Postema, Positivism,
I Presume? ... Comments on Schauer's "Rules and the Rule of Law," 14 HARv. J.L. & PUB.
POLY 797, 813-17 (1991), and ALEXANDER & SHERWIN, supranote 9, at 61-73.
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the Supreme Court was wrong, whether about posited law or about
morality. Although consistency with morality might be taken by the
Supreme Court itself as a necessary criterion of legality, what the
Court itself decides is taken by everyone else as settling the matter
legally--even if neither the Court nor anyone else can settle the
matter morally. It is difficult to conceive of anything we would
recognize as a legal system that did not contain some person or
institution with the authority to settle what the law requiredalthough Hart in The Concept of Law thought that such a system
could count as a "primitive" legal system.4" But if such power of
authoritatively settling the law exists in any well-developed legal
system, then morality itself cannot ultimately be a necessary
condition of legality, at least for anyone other than the institution
or person with the power of authoritative settlement."
Indeed, if consistency with morality were a necessary condition
of legal validity, then the status of the laws designating who is a
judge, who is a legislator, and who is to occupy various other legal
roles would be in doubt as well. And that is because there is no
reason to assume that morality does not speak to these numerous
institutional (and procedural) arrangements as well as to the
substance of the decisions that the institutions will make and the
procedures will shape. If, for example, in our legal system, the
Supreme Court must take consistency with morality to be a
necessary condition for legality, it is theoretically possible that it
might conclude that it itself lacked legal status-perhaps because
it found the method of appointing justices to be inconsistent with
morality-and even if the Court did not so conclude, it would still
be forced into a posture of taking its existence and mode of operation as a factor to be included in the substance of every decision it
made.4 5
43. HART, supra note 3, at 91-92.
44. The position is a bit more contested than we suggest in the text. For our argument
as to why the opposing position is ultimately unsustainable, see generally Larry Alexander
& Frederick Schauer, Defending Judicial Supremacy: A Reply, 17 CONST. COMMENT. 455
(2000); Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On Extrajudicial Constitutional
Interpretation, 110 HARv. L. REV. 1359 (1997). See also Kenneth Einar Himma, Final
Authority to Bind with Moral Mistakes: On the Explanatory Potentialof Inclusive Legal
Position, 24 LAW & PHIL. 1 (2005).
45. We are obviously assuming throughout this Section that the legal norms of the
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Moreover, there is a dynamic that will tend to collapse
incorporationism of this sort (morality as a necessary condition of
legality) into strong incorporationism (morality as a sufficient
condition of legality). For suppose the legislators enact only part of
what morality requires. Then those whose moral rights are violated
will be divided into those who have legal rights and remedies and
those who do not. The same goes for those who breach moral duties:
they will be divided into those who are law violators and those who
are not. And if morality itself forbids discriminating within the
classes of those whose moral rights are violated and those who
have breached moral duties, morality will forbid the law's attempt
to enforce only part of morality. This means that under an incorporationist rule of recognition, lawmaking officials must show not
only that the legal norms are consistent with morality but also that
the limited domain of legal norms is precisely that limited domain
which morality itself would dictate. And that requirement would
destabilize law's settlement function.4 6
An example will illustrate the point. Suppose it is morally wrong
to discriminate on grounds A, B, C, D, and E, and suppose further
that morality demands that any person discriminating on such
grounds shall be subject to sanctions. And then suppose that a
legislature forbids, and imposes sanctions upon, discrimination
based on A, B, or C, but leaves discrimination based on D and E
untouched. We can then ask, if morality is a necessary condition of
legal validity, whether the antidiscrimination law is legally valid?
In one sense, the law is valid, because it comports with what
morality requires. But in another sense it is not valid, because by
discriminating among grounds for discrimination it violates moral
requirements. Consequently, the law can satisfy morality as a
necessary condition of legality only by treatingit as a sufficient one.

limited domain are clearer and more determinate, and thus less controversial, than the
moral norms with which they must comply to be valid. If there were little controversy about
what was morally required but a great deal of controversy over the content of the limited
domain, including controversy over who was the supreme legal authority, then what we have
said in this section would not be correct.
46. This is the basic logical point in Duncan Kennedy, Legal Formality,2 J. LEGALSTUD.
351, 353-54 & n.8, 377-82 (1973). Ronald Dworkin makes a similar point in LAW'S EMPIRE.
DWoRIUN, LAW'S EMPIRE, supra note 26, at 114-15, 130-35.
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The problem of making consistency with morality a necessary
condition of legal validity has an analogue in the criminal law. The
Model Penal Code's "lesser evil" defense,4 7 which has counterparts
in many criminal codes,4" justifies departures from the prohibitions
of the criminal law whenever violating those prohibitions is a lesser
evil than complying with them. It is clear in the Model Penal Code
that "lesser evils" refer to lesser moral evils. But if that is true, the
following problem arises: every criminal law can be reformulated as
"Don't do X unless it is morally better that you do X." And that rule
can be translated into one master criminal law, the Spike Lee
law-"Do the right thing."49 Of course, incorporating morality in
this fashion is less of a problem than it might appear if there is
little controversy over what is and is not a lesser evil or an unjustified risk, and especially if people rarely commit crimes or take
unjustified risks believing that they are truly morally justified in
doing so. But a criminal code that had only the Spike Lee law
would, for reasons we have outlined and for numerous other selfevident reasons, be morally inferior to a more specific set of
criminal laws, and a set of criminal laws whose prohibitions were
taken to be necessary and sufficient conditions for illegality, and
not just as a possibly useful set of suggestions to the public. And if
this set of prohibitions-more specific than a Spike Lee law and
taken seriously in their own right-is viewed as formalistic, then so
be it. Or, to put the same point differently, formalism-in just the
sense of treating legal prohibitions as at least partially opaque to

47. MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.02(1)(a) (Official Draft and Explanatory Notes 1985); see
Larry Alexander, Lesser Evils: A Closer Look at the ParadigmaticJustification,24 LAW &
PHIL. 611, 613-17 (2005); George C. Christie, The Defense of Necessity Consideredfrom the
Legal and Moral Pointsof View, 48 DUKE L.J. 975, 1034-41 (1999).
48. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 463 (2001); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 503.030
(LexisNexis 1999); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 503 (West 1998).
49. DO THE RIGHT THING (Universal City Studios 2001). This reading of the Model Penal
Code's lesser evils section is not quite accurate because following the mandates of the
criminal law is always a safe harbor even in situations where doing so is the greater evil. So
grafting the lesser evils defense onto the criminal law results in the mandate: "Eitherobey
the criminal law or do the right thing."
There are other parts of the criminal law that apparently incorporate morality. For
example, basal notions of culpability, such as recklessness, do so with their references to
"unjustified" risks, risks that ordinary law-abiding persons would not take. See MODELPENAL
CODE § 2.02(2)(c) (Official Draft and Revised Comments 1985).

20071

LAW'S LIMITED DOMAIN

1599

all-things-considered morality-is a defining characteristic and
morally desirable feature of law itself.
VII. MODEST INCORPORATIONISM REDUX: THE CASE OF MORAL
REFERENTS IN SPECIFIC LAWS

Can more modest versions of incorporationism be consistent with
law's limited domain and thus with its settlement function?
Consider the argument that many laws, both constitutional and
statutory, appear to incorporate moral norms or appear to make
moral norms tests for the validity of other laws. In the first category
are "standards" that refer to what is "fair," "just," or "reasonable."
The Fourth Amendment's prohibition on "unreasonable" searches
and seizures is an example of the former,5 ° as is the typical
requirement in custody proceedings that the proper decision is the
one that is in "the child's best interests."'" And in the latter
category are such legal norms as, arguably, the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause, the First Amendment's Free
Speech Clause, the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on "cruel and
unusual" punishments, and, slightly more controversially, the Due
Process Clauses in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.5 2
With respect to standards, they are consistent with law's limited
domain only if, as we have argued in Part II above, morality
functions simply and exclusively as a gap filler, leaving the norms
derived from the limited domain intact. Thus, if an agency were
required by law to ensure that a regulated utility makes only a "fair
return," that legal prescription would have to be understood, in
order to satisfy the settlement function of law, as "a fair return,
accepting as unchangeable the laws of property, taxation, etc." Such
a regulation could not be interpreted as "a fair return in a morally
ideal universe."

50. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.

51. See generally David L. Chambers, Rethinking the Substantive Rules for Custody
Disputes in Divorce, 83 MICH. L. REV. 477, 480-81 (1984).
52. Slightly more controversial only in that there exists the position that "due process"
is a reference only to certain specific and well-settled procedural requirements. See, e.g.,
JOHN HART ELY, DEMocRAcY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 14-21 (1980).
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But what about making specific moral norms necessary conditions for legality, as invocation of "equal protection of the laws,"
"freedom of speech," "free exercise of religion," and "due process of
law" as criteria -of constitutional validity is supposed to illustrate?
First, there is nothing to guarantee that when specific moral norms
are made tests for legal validity, the joints at which law attempts
to carve morality are actually joints that exist within morality.
Suppose, for example, that on the best theory of morality there is no
distinction between "freedom of speech" and "equal protection," or
between "freedom of speech" and "free exercise of religion," or
whatever. Or suppose that on the best theory of morality, there is
in fact no distinct right to free speech at all, or to the free exercise
of religion, or to equality as a right independent of underlying
rights to liberty. 3 Incorporating the morally correct theory of
freedom of speech or free exercise or equal protection then, on this
latter account, would be self-negating (the clauses would be
nullities), or on the former account, would be redundant of other
clauses.
Second, there is no guarantee that the incorporationist provisions
would not completely undermine or alter the nonincorporationist
ones. Suppose, for example, that on the best understanding of the
moral requirements of "equal protection," equal protection is
inconsistent with freedom of speech, with the United States Senate,
with the geographical selection of representatives, and with much
else. Indeed, suppose the entire constitutional edifice offends true
equality, morally speaking.
Of course, these results would be inconsistent with the Framers'
(of the Equal Protection Clause) intent. But although the intentions
of human beings may have a role to play in some accounts of legal
interpretation,surely intentions cannot determine what is morally
correct. If legal norms are meant to incorporate true morality, as
opposed to translating it (fallibly) into determinate rules, then the
intentions of fallible human beings cannot stanch morality's
imperialistic tendency.

53. See generally LARRY ALEXANDER, IS THERE A RIGHT OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION
(2005); PETER WESTEN, SPEAKING OF EQUALITY: AN ANALYSIS OF THE RHETORICAL FORCE OF
'EQUALITY' IN MORAL AND LEGAL DISCOURSE 240-42 (1990).
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Nor can this problem be solved by an incrementalism of the
following sort: "Only apply equal protection, say, to determine
whether a given law is farther from the moral ideal than the legal
status quo ante." The problem cannot be solved in this way because
such a comparison only works if morality is one-dimensional, like
simple maximizing utilitarianism (or other forms of single-value
consequentialism); if morality is not of that nature, it may be
meaningless to ask which of two non-ideal states of affairs is "less
non-ideal." Consider, for example, whether genocide of all X's is
morally worse or better than genocide of all black X's, or whether
capital punishment for all convicted murderers is morally worse or
better than capital punishment for all convicted murders whose last
names begin with W.
Another reason the problem cannot be solved by this type of
incrementalism is that the incremental account cannot explain why
the legal status quo ante should be privileged as against all possible
sets of laws. Incrementalism must take the legal status quo ante as
the baseline by which to determine whether the law, the validity of
which is in question, brings us closer to or farther away from what
the moral norm requires; for once we jettison the legal status quo
ante as the privileged baseline, we must morally assess the entire
corpus juris and compare it to every possible alternative corpus
juris.
VIII. THE MORAL CASE FOR (PARTIALLY) IGNORING MORALITY

Some may respond to these problems by arguing that true
morality would never dictate such a freewheeling and unsettled
legal system. Anarchy is not and cannot be moral, so the response
would go. Rather, true morality would prize guidance and settlement, even if guidance and settlement are fallible and opaque to
true morality. Thus, so the argument would go, guidance, settlement, and even stability serve moral goals, and must be incorporated into any plausible conception of morality.
There is nothing wrong with this response. Indeed, there is
everything right with it. The problem is that this response gives
away the game. It endorses the limited domain view of law in the
name of the unlimited domain of morality. So the response is not
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wrong; quite the contrary, the limited domain of law is indeed so
justified. The normative argument for a limited domain view of law
is a moral argument, just as the argument for a formal approach to
individual rules is a moral argument. The argument for formality
in individual rules is not an argument from formality, and so too
the argument for a formal approach to law as a system-the limited
domain understanding of a legal system-is an argument from
morality and not from formality. The argument for limiting law's
consideration of morality is inescapably a moral argument, and
nothing we say here denies this.
Once we understand that the argument for a limited domain
conception of law, and thus the argument for truncating the
consideration of moral reasons, is itself a moral argument, we can
see why the response noted above gives away the game. Any
victory that the moral argument against anarchy achieves for the
unlimited domain of morality is truly a Pyrrhic one. The unlimited
domain of morality on this view is self-effacing. Or, to put it
differently, morality is modest, and there is a strong moral case for
limiting, in some domains, the use of moral considerations. Law,
therefore, may in some individual cases make morally sub-optimal
decisions, but those morally sub-optimal decisions are part of a
larger and undeniably moral determination of how to make the
morally best decisions in a world of moral conflict and moral
disagreement.
CONCLUSION

Morality is a necessary and defining feature of human reason,
but moral disagreement, although contingent and not necessary, is
nevertheless a pervasive feature of the human predicament. A
central task of institutional design, and a task that is moral to the
core, is that of reconciling the pervasive importance of morality
with the realities of moral uncertainty and moral disagreement. To
treat law as always open to the full universe of moral considerations, however, is to serve only one side of this tension. But if
instead we understand law as a morally motivated social institution
that sees the moral value in settlement and the moral value in
moral certainty, then we can see why law exists as a limited
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domain, and why the moral enterprise of law is, and must be at
least partially, closed to the direct consideration of morality itself.
That law is such an institution, in the legal systems of the world we
experience, is not a moral failing of law-rather, it is the embodiment of morality at morality's fullest, and thus of morality's best.

